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People v. Onofre:
Can the State Peek Into Your Bedroom?
By Mattw Thna Robinsm
Without fanfare, a social/ sexual revolution has
taken place this year in Western New York. In a
thoughtful opinion by Justice Doerr of the Supreme
Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department, §130.38
of the Penal Law of the State of New York was
declared violative of both the State and the Federal
Constitutions. The noteworthy case, People v.
Onofre- 72 A.D. 2d 268 (1980), deals directly with
the important question of State regulation of
activity involving consenting adults in private. The
issue, while important to us all, is critically
important to both the gay and lesbian communities.
The decision was hailed by Susan Cowell of the Gay
Alliance of Genesee Valley as "...something we've
worked hard for. It's a major victory." (Rochester
Democrat and Chronicle, 1/25/80).
On April 29, 1977, Ronald Onofre was charged
with, among other things, the crime of consensual
sodomy. Section 13038 of the Penal Code provides
that ' person is guilty of consensual sodomy when he
engages in deviate sexual intercourse with another
person." Deviate sexual intercourse is defined in
§130.00 (2) as "contact between the penis and the
anus, the mouth and the penis, or the mouth and the
vulva." The statute clearly prohibits homosexual
activity as well as various forms of common
heterosexual conduct, but only to the extent that the
heterosexual conduct is between unmarried persons.
The prohibition is not limited to public conduct, but
extends as well to the sanctity of the bedroom.
Onofre provided an ideal setting in which the
courts in this state could review a controversial law
in the light of changing social attitudes and mores.
The facts of the case were not in dispute and the
defendant pleaded guilty at the trial level. Ronald
Onofre was convicted of the crime of engaging in
"deviate sexual intercourse!' with another man in the
privacy of his own bedroom. The act was engaged in
by competent, consenting adults.
On appeal, both Onofre and the People
identified five basic issues for the court to decide.
The first was whether a United States Supreme Court's
decision in Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney for Ci
of Richmond, 403 F. Supp. 1199 (1975), affirmed
without opinion 425 U.S. 901 (1976), is controlling
authority in this case. Doe was a civil action
seeking a declaratory judgment and permanent
injunction from prosecution under a Virginia statute
similar to section 13038 brought by a gay community
group in Richmond. The Supreme Court refused to '
overturn the lower court's decision but did not
deliver an opinion. The People argued that Doe was
binding on the New York Court because the situation
was sufficiently similar to the one presented by
Onofre. The court, however, agreed with Onofre that
Doe was distinguishable on several important points.
The court noted that Doe was a civil case, not
involving a criminal conviction and that the action
asked for an injunction from prosecution, not a
declaration of constitutionality. Judge Doerr
pointed out that there is a very different situation
where appeal is from an actual conviction of a crime,
requiring a substantially greater degree of scrutiny
than where the action is civil seeking only
injunctive relief.
A second issue raised on appeal involved a
possible violation of the Establishment Clause. The
First Amendment to the United States Constitution, as
applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, and Article I, Section 3 of the New York State
Constitution bar the intrusion of religious matters
into government activities. Onofre argued that the
law was, at least in part, religiously motivated by
pointing to the history of anit-sodomy "statutes" and
"laws" throughout the fundamentalist Judeo-Christian
heritage. The People posited that the law (the
current statute enacted in 1967) was not religiously
based, that the proscribed activity is generally
morally reprehensible. Onofre then tied the
enactment of the statute to a religious purpose
extensively citing the legislative history of the
law. Interestingly, the Bartlett Commission (set up
to make recommendations to the State Legislature
regarding the passage of the new penal code) in 1964
found that "criminal prosecution [for] several acts
privately and discreetly engaged in between
competent, consenting adults serves no salutory
purpose." However, the influence of religiously
based opposition proved potent enough that the
Legislature disregarded the earlier recommendation of
the Bartlett Commission. One witness, testifying on
behalf of the Roman Catholic Church with regard to
the passage of the new Penal Code, urged that
consensual sodomy must remain a crime because: "We
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must take every reasonable step to inhibit
[homosexuality's] spread and to eradicate it."
A third, and perhaps the most important issue
raised was one of privacy. An Amicus Curiae brief,
submitted for Onofre by the National Committee for
Sexual Civil Liberties, pointed out that wording in
the New York State Constitution (Article I, Sections
3, 6, 8, 9, 11, 12) guarantees similar fundamental
rights to privacy that have been "read into" the
Federal Constitution. Onofre contended that the
fundamental right to privacy prevents the State from
entering his bedroom to regulate private activity
between consenting adults. he Supreme Court has
developed and articulated the modern right to privacy
over the past 16 years. In Griswold v. Connecticut.
381 LS. 479 (1965), the Court recognized a privacy
right of married couples to make decisions on the use
of contraceptives. This decision made it clear that
there existed a sacred 'zone of privacy" into which
the State may not intrude. Stanley v. Georgia 394
U.S. 557 (1969), extended the privacy right to the
possession of obscene material for the purpose of
sexual stimulation in the seclusion of one's own
home. It would, seem that the Court is making clear
that an individual has the right to make basic,
personal decisions affecting hin/herself, free from
unwarranted governmental intrusions. Finally, in
Eisenstadt v. Baird. 405 U.S. 438 (1972), the Supreme
Court extended those 'penmnbral rights" established
in Griswold and expanded in Stanley concerning
fundamental decisions affecting their bodies, to
unmarried persons making procreation judgements.
Onofre contended that the privacy right prohibited
the State from intruding into decisions concerning
the control of his own body in personal
relationships. He asserted that the rights of
privacy and liberty guarantee personal autonomy for
the individual. Further, Onofre argued that his home
is to be afforded a special sanctity and reverence.
The State responded that the cases Onofre
relied on were inapplicable because of significant
factual differences (i.e.,Griswold and Eisenstadt
both focus on the question of bearing children). The
People urge that to expand the right of privacy to
two homosexuals who wish to engage in consensual
sodomy, even in the seclusion of their own home,
would be an unwarranted expansion. The State further
contended that "the right of privacy does not apply
to the crime of consensual sodomy." (emphasis in
original)
Justice Doerr declared that 'Tersonal sexual
conduct is a fundamental right protected by the right
to privacy because of the transcendental importance
of sex to the human condition, the intimacy of the
conduct, and its relationship to a person's right to
control his own body..." The court found that the
privacy right was broad enough to include sexual acts
between non-married persons, including intimate,
consensual homosexual conduct. Justice Doerr
admonished that the decision, with respect to the
privacy issue, must be very strictly construed. He
emphasized that we can not lose sight of the fact
that we deal here with two competent, mutually
consenting adults in the privacy of their own home.
The fourth issue raised by Onofre involved
Equal Protection. The right of Equal Protection
afforded under the New York State and the United
States Constitutions is the same. Onofre asserted
that under the statute he is not afforded the same
protection as, for example, married couples. The
statute specifically makes illegal conduct that would
be legal if carried out by a married couple. This is
a distinction not permitted by Eisenstadt. The
amicus brief also pointed out that 'Nqo one can
seriously suggest that any questions of health are
involved; presumably married persons who engage in
acts of sodomy are no more threatened than unmarried
persons who refrain from doing so." The People
assert that the distinction between married persons
and non-married persons is a valid one as a means "to
uphold the societal interest in the basic institution
of marriage..."
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Finally, there is a Due Process argument, not
easily understood, embracing both the privacy and the
Equal Protection issues. Onofre contended that the
statute is both unreasonable and arbitrary because it
does not afford him the due process of law guaranteed
by the Constitution. The State contended that the
statute does not violate any due process rights
because it is a reflection of the general
populations "sincere moral conviction that consensul
sodomy is unacceptable..." The State pointed to the
fact that there have been numerous efforts in the
legislature to remove the statute from the books and
all have failed.
In ruling on the constitutionality of a
statute, such as §130.38, the court must take into
account the interests of both the State and the
individual. Here, for example, the State may claim
that the statute serves to help insure the health and
safety of the citizenry, promote the institutions of
marriage and the family, as well as to generally
promote morality. Justice Doerr rather summarily
dismisses these State contentions in his opinion as
being superficial and unsubstantiated. He
serisitively pointed out that 'qually important in
the community of man would seem to be some degree of
toleration of ideas and moral choices with which one
disagrees." The interest of Onofre and countless
thousands of unmarried gay and straight citizens is
freedom from governmental intrusion into the most
private and intimate activity in which they may
choose to engage.
In a telephone conversation, Justice Doerr
reiterated his opinion that with regard to personal,
private, consensual conduct or sexual activity, it is
not the province of the State to regulate. The State
has no legitimate interest in this type of
regulation. He stressed, however, that the opinion
was to be narrowly construed. When asked whether or
not it was the job of the courts to make such a
finding when the Legislature has not seen fit to
removfe the statute from the books after repeated
attempts, he firmly replied it was, in a situation
like that presented by Onofre.
After a finding by the Appellate Division that
the statute was unconstitutional, the State decided
to appeal to the highest court in New York State, the
Court of Appeals. The case, joined with some other
similar cases, was argued before the Court of Appeals
on October 8, 1981) A decision is expected virtually
any day now (it may have been handed down prior to
publication). Judge Doerr expressed confidence that
if the Court of Appeals reached the merits of the
case, that the Appellate Division decision would
stand. Unfortunately, a procedural technicality
(having to do with the right of appeal in New York
State of one who has plead guilty to a charge) may
prevent the court from reaching the merits of the
case. In the interest of stare decisis. the Court of
Appeals may be required to reverse the Appellate
Division decisior. In any event it is hoped that the
other cases argued with Onofre will permit the court
to rule on the merits of Onofre.
People v. Onofre is an interesting and an
important case to us all. 'It is important, if not
for the right to freedom of private sexual
preference, then for the reemphasis of the idea that
a tyranny of the majority will not be tolerated in
this State. We must never lose sight of the fact
that we deal with human beings and human emotio. It
is peculiarly the province of the law and of lawyers,
in balancing the factors involved in any given
situation, to fashion the working rules under which
we deal with each other on a day to day basis. The
attitudes of society are constantly changing, now
perhaps more and faster than ever. The law ought to
keep abreast of, and be sensitive to those changes.
It must be cognizant of what is myth and what is
reality in cur world.
Robert Abrams in his capacity as Attorney
General of' the State of New York made these remarks
opening a 1979 conference at the New York University
School of Law entitled 'Law and the Fight for Gay
Rights":
The issue of privacy, when broadly defined,
should encompass the right to one's life
uninhibited, no matter how controversial or
conventionally unacceptable that lifestyle is.
Defined this way, the right of privacy is a
central issue for the gay community. It is a
central issue for racial, ethnic, and religious
communities and for women. Intense opposition to
all of these groups often focuses on the right of
individual members to make personal life style
decisions unacceptable to the majority..Thus,
this broadly defined privacy right is of concern
to each of these groups. It is a common interest
in which all are linked and around which all
could join forces to achieve the basic rights
that each is seeking. (emphasis added)
For better or worse, all who are unmarried fall
under the purview of section 130.38 of the Penal Law,
We ought to look forward to a forthcoming ruling by
the Court of Appeals. 0
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